Fordham Law Review
Volume 78

Issue 3

Article 1

2009

Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide
Howard M. Erichson
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 Fordham L. Rev.
1117 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide
Cover Page Footnote
* This symposium, held at Fordham Law School on April 3, 2009, was organized by the Fordham Law
Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Conflict Resolution and ADR Program. John Bronsteen, Amy
Cohen, Kenneth Feinberg, Owen Fiss, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Samuel Issacharoff, Michael Moffitt, Susan
Sturm, and Jack Weinstein spoke; Matthew Diller, Michael M. Martin, Beth Schwartz, William Treanor, and
I served as moderators; and Helen Herman and symposium editor Anu Sawkar handled much of the
organizational work. Thanks to all of the participants, organizers, and attendees for a superb program. **
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss3/1

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Vol. 78

December 2009

No. 3

CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM
AGAINST SETTLEMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER
FOREWORD:

REFLECTIONS ON THE

ADJUDICATION-SETTLEMENT DIVIDE ....

Howard M. Erichson 1117

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE

John Bronsteen

ECONOMICS OF SETTLEMENT ..................

1129

REVISITING AGAINST SETTLEMENT
SOME REFLECTIONS ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC VALUES .............

Amy J. Cohen 1143

REEXAMINING THE ARGUMENTS IN
OWEN

M. FISS,

AGAINST SETTLEMENT...

Kenneth R. Feinberg 1171

.....

Samuel Issacharoff 1177
& Robert H. Klonoff

THE PUBLIC VALUE OF SETTLEMENT

THREE THINGS
("SETTLEMENT"

To BE

AGAINST

NOT INCLUDED)

MEDIATION EXCEPTIONALITY ........
COMMENTS ON OWEN
AGAINST SETTLEMENT

M.

Michael Moffitt

.............

1203

Jacqueline Nolan-Haley 1247

FISS,

(1984) ......... Hon. Jack B. Weinstein 1265
Owen M. Fiss 1273

THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA .....................

ARTICLE
Do:

WHAT OWNERS WANT AND GOVERNMENTS
EVIDENCE FROM THE OREGON

Bethany R. Berger 1281

EXPERIMENT ..............................

NOTES
LOVE THY NEIGHBOR:

SHOULD RELIGIOUS

ACCOMMODATIONS THAT NEGATIVELY AFFECT
COWORKERS'

SHIFT PREFERENCES CONSTITUTE

AN UNDUE HARDSHIP ON THE
EMPLOYER UNDER TITLE

VII?

.......... Rachel M. Birnbach 1331

THE RIGHTS OF DIVORCED LESBIANS:
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF CHILD
CUSTODY JUDGMENTS IN THE CONTEXT

OF SAME-SEX DIVORCE ...................
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS,
A COUNTRYWIDE CRISIS:

A

CAFA,

Kathryn J. Harvey

1379

Denise MazzeD

1433

AND

CALL FOR

CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY ..................
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
INFORMATION DISCLOSED TO AN ATTORNEY
WITH THE INTENTION THAT THE ATTORNEY
DRAFT A DOCUMENT

To

BE RELEASED TO

THIRD PARTIES: PUBLIC POLICY CALLS FOR
AT LEAST THE STRICTEST APPLICATION OF
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE .........

Daniel Northrop 1481

TOWARD EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF

11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E):

INVIGORATING
A POWERFUL BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION .....

Uriel Rabinovitz

1521

WHEN COWS FLY: EXPANDING COGNIZABLE
INJURY-IN-FACT AND INTEREST GROUP
LITIGATION ................................

Robert Terenzi, Jr. 1559

SYMPOSIUM
AGAINST SETTLEMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

LATER*
FOREWORD: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ADJUDICATION-SETTLEMENT DIVIDE
HowardM Erichson* *

Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state power to
bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.l
Whenever I catch myself thinking of litigation solely as a means of
dispute resolution, or whenever I get too enamored of market mechanisms
as litigation endgames, the words of Owen Fiss echo in my head and force
me to take a broader view.
The first time I read Against Settlement,2 I confess I was a bit horrified.
Litigation is often winner-take-all; settlement is satisfaction. Litigation is
war; settlement is peace. Who could be anti-satisfaction? Who could be
anti-peace? But Owen Fiss asks us to think of justice as a value beyond
satisfaction and peace. Rejecting the view that civil litigation is all about
resolving disputes, Fiss insists that we consider litigation in grander terms:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by
the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the public
participates. These officials... possess a power that has been defined
and conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but
to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts

*
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Fordham Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Conflict Resolution and ADR
Program. John Bronsteen, Amy Cohen, Kenneth Feinberg, Owen Fiss, Jacqueline NolanHaley, Samuel Issacharoff, Michael Moffitt, Susan Sturm, and Jack Weinstein spoke;
Matthew Diller, Michael M. Martin, Beth Schwartz, William Treanor, and I served as
moderators; and Helen Herman and symposium editor Anu Sawkar handled much of the
organizational work. Thanks to all of the participants, organizers, and attendees for a superb
program.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
2. 93 YALE L.J. 1073.
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such as the Constitution and statutes:
to interpret those values and to
3
bring reality into accord with them.
If the point of adjudication is not merely to resolve private disputes, but to
bring reality closer to our ideals through decision making by officials
charged with public responsibilities, then private settlement comes at a
public price. While we need not be altogether against settlement, at least
we should not celebrate it indiscriminately. Twenty-five years later, Fiss's
core argument may be more important than ever as a caution against
freewheeling encouragement of settlement.
For this symposium, the Fordham Law Review invited some of the
nation's leading experts in procedure and dispute resolution to consider the
arguments in Against Settlement in light of litigation and negotiation
developments of the past twenty-five years. The result is a remarkable
series of papers reflecting on a broad array of issues concerning
adjudication, settlement, and the relative advantages of each. This
Foreword highlights two themes from among the many suggested by these
papers. First, it looks at views on whether settlement can in fact advance
the values Fiss espouses. Second, to help define what is at stake in the
debate, it looks at the sometimes fuzzy line between adjudication and
settlement.
I. AGAINST SETTLEMENT?

A dominant question running through the papers is whether Fiss's core
point is really anti-settlement or whether it instead reflects a broader set of
concerns about public values in a democracy.
The argument goes
something like this: Despite his provocative title, Fiss is not really against
settlement. Or, at least, he need not be. Rather than ask what he is against,
we might ask what he is for. Fiss favors public values and principled
deliberation. Settlement, on this argument, should be attractive if it has the
capacity to advance public values and to achieve outcomes based on
principle.
4
Amy Cohen develops this idea most explicitly and comprehensively.
"For Fiss," she suggests, "the more salient (and universalizing) distinction
[is] between moral deliberation and interest satisfaction" rather than
between adjudication and alternative dispute resolution. 5
Cohen
contextualizes Against Settlement both by reading it against the backdrop of
Fiss's other work and by placing the article in the historical context of the
1970s and early 1980s. Fiss's point, on Cohen's reading, is not so much
about settlement versus adjudication, but rather about moral deliberation
and the advancement of public values. Negotiated dispute resolution, she

3. Id. at 1085.
4. Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute
Resolution andPublic Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1143 (2009).
5. Id. at 1147.
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suggests, has the capacity to advance public values through moral
6
deliberation in ways that are fundamentally consistent with Fiss's vision.
Kenneth Feinberg, an experienced mediator of complex disputes,
similarly suggests that Fiss's main objective is the vindication of norms and
values and that settlement is consistent with that objective in certain types
of cases. 7 Feinberg cautions that an anti-settlement view runs up against
the "hard, practical realities" of the political inertia of the legislative and
executive branches and the inefficiency and unpredictability of the civil
justice system. 8 Using a word that surely captures what Fiss is against,
Feinberg reports that the "consumers" of the civil justice system simply do
not want to 0go to trial. 9 Treating Fiss's call for adjudication as
"aspirational,"' Feinberg concludes that the "best recipe for vindicating
what [Fiss] really wants vindicated" is a proactive trial judge who will
manage the litigation to ensure broad participation, perhaps leading to
settlement. "I
Michael Moffitt offers that perhaps Fiss "was merely urging us to
dampen our enthusiasm for settlement" rather than presenting a binary
choice. 12 He notes, however, that "the title Fiss chose and the language he
uses in [the] article make more nuanced readings like these difficult.'

13

Instead of accepting the choice as binary, Moffitt offers "three things to be
against" that are suggested by Fiss's article but that need not lead to an antisettlement position. Power imbalances, agency costs, and barriers to access
can occur in both litigation and settlement, he points out. 14 According to
Moffitt, proponents of litigation and proponents of settlement embrace the
same values of efficiency, justice, truth, and stability, and both litigation
and settlement advance those values imperfectly. 15
Susan Sturm, in her presentation at the symposium, urged a broader
understanding of the judge's legitimate role. The judge, Sturm explained,
can facilitate the elaboration of norms by relevant actors. By creating
contexts within which stakeholders intervene, and by facilitating
participation, judges can help the parties and communities involved in
disputes elaborate the values that should determine how the dispute is
resolved. Sturm approached the settlement-adjudication question from the
perspective of one who has written that "rule-of-law principles can be
realized using non-adjudicative processes that integrate individual and
6. Id.
at 1167-68.
7. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reexamining the Arguments in Owen Fiss, Against Settlement,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2009).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
at 1171-72.
Id.
at 1172.
Id.
at 1171.
Id.
at 1176.
Michael Moffitt, Three Things To Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78

FORDHAML. REv. 1203, 1245 (2009).

13. Id.
14. Id at 1218-32.
15. Id.
at 1245.
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systemic issues" 1 6 and that "formal and informal systems are mutually
constitutive, with capacities to generate public values for conflicts of
different types."' 17 From this perspective, negotiated dispute resolution
need not be antithetical to the elaboration of public values.
Other contributors take the Against Settlement argument at something
closer to face value but argue that Fiss reaches the wrong conclusion
because he undervalues settlement.
Samuel Issacharoff and Robert
Klonoff, focusing on class actions and aggregate litigation, argue that "the
ability of a legal system to resolve the repeat harms associated with mass
society is itself an important justice value, one that brings recompense to
the many, deters untoward behavior, and provides a critical private lever to
prevent state regulatory monopoly."' 8 Issacharoff and Klonoff recently
completed their work as Reporter and one of the Associate Reporters for the
American Law Institute's (ALl) Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation, in which the ALl endorsed several proposals that would
significantly facilitate mass settlements in both class and nonclass
litigation. 19 Turning to the components of Fiss's anti-settlement argument,
they point out that plaintiffs' law firms in mass litigation now battle on a
level field with large corporate defendants. 20 They also take issue with
Fiss's assertions that plaintiffs in mass settlements cannot give meaningful
22
consent 21 and that settlements foreclose ongoing judicial supervision.
Finally, they turn to Fiss's primary concern-that settlements achieve peace
but not justice. 23 Issacharoff and Klonoff use the massive Vioxx product
liability settlement and other examples to argue that "the trial route has no
24
monopoly on justice."
Judge Jack Weinstein weighs in on the side of settlement, at least in
certain types of cases. 25 Having played a central role in litigation over
Agent Orange, asbestos, DES, tobacco, breast implants, handguns, and
Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein has seen his share of complex disputes. Noting
that "[s]ettlements may be even more desirable in the mass commercial age
in which we now live," 26 he distinguishes between cases that require
16. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J.
Disp. RESOL. 1, 52.

17. Id. at 57.
18. Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2009).
19. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.06 (Proposed Final Draft

2009) (proposing that settlement class actions be certifiable even if they could not be
certified for litigation); id § 3.14 (opposing collateral attacks on class settlements); id. §
3.17(b) (proposing that clients be permitted to give advance consent to aggregate settlements
with a supermajority voting provision).
20. Issacharoff& Klonoff, supra note 18, at 1179-84.
21. Id. at 1184-88.
22. Id. at 1190-95.
23. Id. at 1195.
24. Id. at 1199.
25. Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 1265 (2009).

26. Id. at 1266.
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adjudication and those in which settlement is desirable or even essential.
He cites Brown v. Board of Education,27 in which he participated as a
litigator, as an example of the former, a case in which "settlement[] [was]
not possible." 28 He contrasts this with cases in which settlement is not only
possible, but possibly the only way to achieve a just outcome. 29 In the
Agent Orange class action, 30 Weinstein says, settlement was essential. 3 1
Despite some evidence of negligence and causation in that case,
"[1]itigation would likely have resulted in the rejection of veterans' claims";
under the circumstances, Weinstein saw settlement as achieving greater
justice than would have been accomplished by adjudication. 32
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, in a comparative study of mediation in the
United States and the United Kingdom, begins with Fiss's objection to the
quality of consent in many settlements. 33 While sharing his concern about
the importance of consent, Nolan-Haley points out that the nature of
consent-not only consent to settlement but even consent to the mediation
process itself-varies considerably across legal systems. 34
John Bronsteen, in contrast to most of the symposium participants,
counts himself as a supporter of Fiss's broader position on settlement and
offers support for the anti-settlement view based on recent literature in
psychology and economic analysis. 35 Although most of the economic
literature takes a pro-settlement position, Bronsteen advances an alternative
view based on benefits provided by trials. These benefits include reducing
disputes through law articulation and satisfying human preferences for
36
fairness and participation.
Despite all the urging that Fissian ideals can be achieved not only
through adjudication but also through well-crafted alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, Owen Fiss himself stands firm. In The History of
an Idea,37 Fiss affirms that he meant what he said-he really is against
settlement. Fiss recounts what led him as a lawyer and scholar to take a
strong stance in favor of adjudication. His description of Judge Frank M.
Johnson, Jr., whom Fiss encountered during the 1960s in school
desegregation litigation, could equally serve as a description of Fiss's
adjudication ideal: "He patiently listened to all the grievances that were
presented to him, heard from all the affected parties, tried the law and facts
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

28. Weinstein, supra note 25, at 1268.
29. Id.at 1265, 1268-70.
30. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(approving class action settlement), aft'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
31. Weinstein, supra note 25, at 1268-69.
32. Id.
33. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1249
(2009).

34. Id. at 1250-51.
35. John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1129, 1129-30 (2009).
36. Id. at 1133-41.
37. Owen Fiss, The Historyof an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009).

1122

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

in open court, and then publicly justified his decision on the basis of
principle." 38 As the ADR movement gathered steam in the early 1980s,
39
Fiss saw the goals of that movement as antithetical to the goal of justice.
Picking up on ideas he had developed in Foreword.- The Forms of
Justice,40 Fiss drew a contrast between the structural reform litigation that
had been his focus and "the dispute resolution model" that he saw
41
emerging.
Against Settlement offered two lines of argument. The first was based on
concerns about the settlement process itself, in particular the problem of
43
unequal bargaining power 42 and the problem of questionable consent.
The second was more fundamental, the idea that adjudication serves a
different and greater purpose than peace. 44 In his paper for this symposium,
Fiss backs off from the first line of argument4 5 and emphasizes the more
fundamental point that "the purpose of adjudication is not the resolution of
a dispute, not to produce peace, but rather justice." 46 As to that second line
of argument, Fiss shows no sign of mellowing. "The bargaining that
normally takes place between litigants," he writes, "has no connection to
47
justice whatsoever."
Much of Fiss's reasoning lends support to the view advanced by Amy
Cohen and others that, at bottom, Fiss does not so much reject settlement as
insist upon principled deliberation and the elaboration of public values.
Indeed, in The History of an Idea, Fiss's strongest attachment appears to be
48
to "the strictures of public reason," a phrase that appears five times.
Several of the symposium participants suggest that settlement can be guided
by public reason and can even help shape public values. To Fiss, however,
the strictures of public reason are linked to adjudication, not settlement:
"The strictures of public reason not only confer authority, but also limit it,
and thus ban the use of judicial power to insist upon, or even promote,
' 49
settlement [through judicial strong-arming].
We are left with enduring questions about what can be achieved by
adjudication and settlement. Is there something about adjudicationdecision making by public officials based on articulated norms-that cannot
be replicated by negotiated resolutions? And even if settlement can achieve
not merely peace but justice, is it illegitimate for judges to participate in its
promotion?
38. Id.at 1274.
39. Id. at 1276.
40. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93

HARv. L. REv.

I (1979).

41. Fiss, supra note 37, at 1275.
42. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1076-78.

43. Id. at 1078-82.
44. Id. at 1085-87.
45. Fiss, supra note 37, at 1276 ("On reflection, this portion of the essay seems

labored....").
46. Id.
47. Id.at 1277.
48. Id.at 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279.

49. Id.at 1278.
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I do not share Fiss's antipathy toward settlement, nor do I share the
strength of his faith in adjudication. Increasingly, however, I have been
critical of certain approaches to achieving comprehensive resolutions
through settlement. 50 In thinking about settlement structures, I have
benefited from Fiss's broadside on the dispute resolution model. By
encouraging us to ignore the dogmatic version of the "settlement is good"
mantra, Fiss opened the door to more careful consideration of settlement
approaches and invited us to consider more clearly what is gained and what
is lost when parties forsake adjudication.
II. DEFINING ADJUDICATION AND SETTLEMENT

Thinking about Against Settlement today, I am struck by one of the most
basic assumptions underlying the argument that adjudication is superior to
settlement. It is the assumption that one can tell the difference between
adjudication and settlement.
In some contexts, the line between
adjudication and settlement is exceedingly blurry and has become more so
in recent years. As we think about the arguments against settlement, it is
worth pausing over this development to ask which way it cuts. Perhaps the
infusion of adjudicatory elements into settlement should allay some of
Fiss's concerns because a judge's involvement provides a safeguard against
unjust settlements. Or perhaps it is the opposite: that the infusion of
negotiation into adjudication, and the cooption of judicial processes for
purposes of reaching negotiated resolutions, confirm Fiss's fear that
negotiation eviscerates genuine public decision making.
The most obvious point of obscurity along the adjudication-settlement
border is the class action settlement. A class settlement does not become
binding unless the court approves it.5 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e) requires that the court hold a hearing to determine whether the
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 52 With the court's approval,
the negotiated class settlement becomes a judgment of the court, binding
upon all of the class members who did not opt out. 53 Is a class action
settlement better understood as settlement or adjudication?

50. See Howard M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.

REV. 1769, 1798, 1802 (2005); Howard M. Erichson, Public and PrivateLaw Perspectives:
Transcriptof ProfessorHoward Erichson, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 665, 665-68 (2008); Howard
M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 2010).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval.").
Settlements in shareholder derivative suits similarly require judicial approval. FED. R. Civ. P.
23.1(c) ("A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only
with the court's approval.").
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
53. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 378 (1996) (treating a
judicially approved state court class action settlement as a judgment entitled to full
preclusive effect under the full faith and credit statute).
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On the one hand, it is a judgment of the court entered after a hearing,
binding on every class member regardless of their consent. That looks a lot
like adjudication. The approval process bears at least a resemblance to the
adversary system inasmuch as Rule 23 requires notice and a hearing and
54
permits class members to present objections to the proposed settlement.
Moreover, the effect of an approved class settlement supports defining it as
a type of adjudication. As a matter of claim preclusion and full faith and
credit, the "settlement judgment" in a class action binds the class5 5members
no less powerfully than a class action judgment entered after trial.
On the other hand, in a class action settlement, the court does not actually
determine the merits of the claims and defenses, the remedies are not
limited to those prescribed by law, and the outcome is whatever the parties
negotiated. That looks a lot like settlement. A judge reviewing a class
settlement has an important but distinctly limited role evaluating the
fairness and adequacy of the settlement that the parties themselves
negotiated. The judge may not dictate terms that the parties have not agreed
to. 56 When a dispute is resolved by a class settlement, the result is not a
resolution according to a judge's determination of what the law requires but
rather a resolution based on negotiation, albeit one that the judge has found
reasonable.
A class action settlement, in sum, does not fall neatly on one side of the
adjudication-settlement divide. 57 Indeed, it is neither. Or, more accurately,
it is both. It is an adjudication giving effect to a negotiated resolution, and
it is a settlement effectuated by the court's judgment.
Nonclass settlements, too, raise questions along the adjudicationsettlement divide. Some judges overseeing mass litigation have used the
term "quasi-class action" to justify judicial supervision of settlements and
fees. 58 In the product liability litigation concerning the antipsychotic drug
Zyprexa, Judge Weinstein oversaw a settlement resolving the claims of

54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), (2), (5) (covering notice, hearing, and objectors, respectively).
55. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378-79.
56. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726 (1986) ("Rule 23(e) wisely requires court
approval of the terms of any settlement of a class action, but the power to approve or reject a
settlement negotiated by the parties before trial does not authorize the court to require the
parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed."). The same is true of
shareholder derivative actions. See United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he business judgment of the court is not to
be substituted for that of the parties .... ). This does not mean, of course, that judges lack
the ability to influence the terms of class action and derivative action settlements. Among
other things, judges may indicate terms that they would find acceptable. Ultimately,
however, the terms of the deal belong to the negotiating parties and are submitted to the
judge for approval or rejection.
57. Indeed, in Matsushita, the U.S. Supreme Court referred repeatedly to the "settlement
judgment" in the prior class action. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 380,
386.
58. See generally Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-classAction Method
of Managing Multi-district Litigations:
(forthcoming Jan. 2010).

Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV.
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about 8000 individual plaintiffs. 59 Although the litigation was not certified
as a class action and thus the aggregate settlement was a private agreement
between the defendant and the individual claimants, Judge Weinstein
"approved" the settlement. 60 Did he have the power to disapprove it? The
judge reasoned that the settlement of such a complex case required
significant judicial involvement and oversight:
While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has many of
the characteristics of a class action; it may be characterized properly as a
quasi-class action subject to the general equitable power of the court. The
large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix approved
by the court, the utilization of special masters appointed by the court to
control discovery and to assist in reaching and administering a settlement,
the court's order approving and controlling a huge escrow fund, [and]
other interventions by the court in controlling discovery for all
claimants.., reflect a degree of court control that supports the imposition
of fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment6 to
all parties and counsel
regarding issues such as settlement procedures. 1
Similarly, when Merck negotiated a settlement to resolve about 50,000
individual plaintiffs' claims in the litigation over its painkiller Vioxx, Judge
Eldon Fallon claimed substantial power over the settlement even while
referring to it as a "private" settlement agreement. 62 Judge Fallon deployed
the "quasi-class action" concept to justify the court's oversight over fees
and other matters: "[T]his Court found that 'the Vioxx global settlement
may properly be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the
Court equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for
reasonableness.' 63 Interestingly, judicial power over the Vioxx settlement
comes not only from the judge's assertion of equitable authority but from
the settlement agreement itself:
The Settlement Agreement is a voluntary opt in agreement and expressly
contemplates that this Court shall oversee various aspects of the
administration of settlement proceedings, including appointing a Fee
Allocation Committee, allocating a percentage of the settlement proceeds
to a Common Benefit Fund, approving a cost assessment, and modifying
any provisions of the Settlement Agreement that are otherwise
59. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2592
(JBW), 2009 WL 2425983, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) ("In November 2005, Lilly,

without conceding liability, entered into a settlement covering some 8,000 individual
plaintiffs. The settlement resolved virtually all cases then pending in the MDL, along with
some state cases." (citation omitted)).
60. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596 (JBW), 2005 WL 3117302
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005).

61. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citations omitted).
62. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2009 WL 2408884, at *2 (E.D. La.
Aug. 3, 2009).

63. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612 (E.D. La.
2008)).
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unenforceable. Accordingly, this Court has consistently exercised its
inherent authority over the MDL proceedings in coordination with its
express authority under the terms of the Settlement Agreement to ensure
that the settlement proceedings move forward in a uniform and efficient
manner.64

The Vioxx settlement agreement named Judge Fallon the "Chief
65
Administrator" of the settlement.
The Zyprexa and Vioxx aggregate settlements were negotiated
resolutions; they were not adjudications of the claims and defenses on the
merits. Moreover, unlike settlement judgments in class actions, the
Zyprexa and Vioxx settlements were binding because of the agreement of
the parties and the releases provided by the claimants, not because a court
entered a judgment. Thus, these are quite clearly settlements. The element
of judicial involvement, however, is powerful. The judges in these mass
torts served as settlement facilitators, reviewers, and supervisors.
Cases involving judicial examination of settlements are a constant in the
civil justice system. When the Securities and Exchange Commission
reached a settlement with Bank of America for a multimillion dollar civil
penalty in a dispute concerning bonuses paid in connection with Bank of
America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch, the consent judgment required the
court's approval. 66 District Judge Jed Rakoff noted that "[s]ociety greatly
benefits when lawsuits are amicably resolved," but a consent judgment that
"seeks to prospectively invoke the Court's own contempt power by having
the Court impose injunctive prohibitions ... has aspects of a judicial
decree" and requires the court "to review the proposal a little more closely,
to ascertain whether it is within the bounds of fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy." 67 He proceeded to reject the settlement, finding that "[e]ven
under the most deferential review, this proposed Consent Judgment cannot
68
remotely be called fair."
Against Settlement treated class action settlements, consent judgments,
and other judicially sanctioned deals as settlements rather than
adjudications. 69 Fiss considered and rejected the idea that judicial

64. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
65. Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement

§ 6.1.1

(Nov. 9, 2007), available at

http://www.beasleyallen.com/alerts/attachmentsVioxx%2Master%/2OSettlement%2OAgree
ment%20-%2OWith%2OExhibits.pdf ("This is a private agreement. At the request of the
Parties, The Honorable Eldon E. Fallon has agreed to preside over the Program in the
capacities specified herein. For convenience, Judge Fallon will be referred to herein as the
'Chief Administrator."').
66. Mark Hamblett, Judge Seeks Further Briefing in Bank of America Bonus Case,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 2009, at 1.

67. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 2009 WL 2916822, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009).

68. Id. at *3.
69. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1079-82 (discussing the role of class representatives and
the judge's role in class settlements).

2009]

AGAINST SETTLEMENT FOREWORD

1127

supervision should remove his objections to settlements. 70 In The History
of an Idea, Fiss states his position on judicially approved settlements more
strongly than ever:
I also believe that it is impermissible for judges to approve settlements
and lend their authority to them as when a consent decree is entered or a
class action is settled. This is true not only in the institutional reform or
civil rights cases that have been at the center of my concern,
but also to
71
the mass tort cases that dominate the contemporary docket.
To Fiss, determinations of whether negotiated settlement agreements are
"within the ballpark" fall outside of the judicial role, properly conceived. 72
Fiss also notes that "the judgment of reasonableness is often made without
'73
the benefit of a truly adversarial process.
The divide between adjudication and settlement has become increasingly
blurry in the world of class and "quasi-class" litigation. Moreover, as many
of the symposium participants emphasized, even where adjudication and
settlement are neatly separable, the divide between them is not so stark as
Fiss suggests in terms of the values they serve. Adjudication and settlement
offer some of the same benefits and entail some of the same risks. So much
depends upon the circumstances under which they are used and the way in
which they are deployed. The papers in this symposium stand not only as a
testament to the importance of Fiss's argument and the enduring
controversy surrounding it, but also as an invitation to continue exploring
the divide between adjudication and settlement.

70. See id.at 1082 ("The basis for approving a settlement... [is] the settlement's
approximation to judgment. This might appear to remove my objection to settlement, except
that the judgment being used as a measure of the settlement is very odd indeed: It has never
in fact been entered, but only imagined.").
71. Fiss, supra note 37, at 1278.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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